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ABSTRACT The trend of decentralization of energy services has given rise to community energy systems.
These energy communities aim to maximize the self-consumption of local renewable energy generated and
stored in assets that are typically connected to low-voltage (LV) distribution networks. Energy community
schemes often involve jointly owned assets such as community-owned solar photo-voltaic panels (PVs), wind
turbines and/or shared battery storage. This raises the question of how these assets should be controlled
in real-time, and how the energy outputs from these jointly owned assets should be shared fairly among
heterogeneous community members. Crucially, such real-time control and fair sharing of energy must
also consider the technical constraints of the community, such as the local LV network characteristics,
voltage limits and power ratings of electric cables and transformers. In this paper, we design and analyze
a heuristic-based battery control algorithm that considers the influence of battery life degradation, and
the resultant increase in local renewable energy consumption within local operating constraints of the LV
network. We provide a model that first studies the techno-economic benefits of community-owned versus
individually-owned energy assets considering the network/grid constraints. Then, using the methodology
and principles from cooperative game theory, we propose a redistribution model for benefits in a community
based on the marginal contribution of each household. The results from our study demonstrate that the
redistribution mechanism is fairer and computationally tractable compared to the existing state-of-the-art
methods. Thus, our methodology is more scalable with respect to modeling the economic sharing of joint
assets in community energy systems.
INDEX TERMS Battery degradationmodel, coalitional game theory, community energy storage, community




i for agents (households)
C for community
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Salvatore Favuzza .
N set of the number of agents (households)
T set of the number of time periods
PARAMETERS
ηc battery charging efficiency
ηd battery discharging efficiency
SoC initial initial battery SoC [%]
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SoCmax maximum battery SoC [%]
SoCmin minimum battery SoC [%]
DoD battery depth of discharge [%]
pbat,max maximum power that battery can
charge/discharge [kW]
V slack bus voltage of the slack/reference bus [V]
Pcurtailed curtailed power i.e curtailment of export
from renewable generator (solar PV/wind
turbine), or curtailment of export/import
from/to battery [kW]
τ s(t) selling price (export tariff) at t [pence/kWh]
τ b(t) buying price (import tariff) at t [pence/kWh]
cAi (T ) annualized cost of the asset for agent i,
where T = 1 year [£/kWh for battery, and
£/kW for solar PV/wind turbine]
cAC(T ) annualized cost of the asset for community
C, where T = 1 year [£/kWh for battery, and
£/kW for solar PV/wind turbine]
VARIABLES
t time period
1t duration of the time period t
SoC(t) battery state of charge at t [%]
DFregular depreciation factor due to regular cycle
DFirregular depreciation factor due to irregular cycle
V bus(t) bus voltage at t [V]
Pbus(t) bus power at t [kW]
gwind/solari (t) power from the renewable generator of agent
i at t [kW]
gwind/solar(t)C power from the renewable generator of com-
munity C at t [kW]
pgridi (t) power from the utility grid of agent i at t
[kW]
pgridC (t) power from the utility grid of community C
at t [kW]
pbati (t) power of the battery for agent i at t [kW],
charging(-ve) and discharging(+ve)
pbatC (t) power of the battery for community C at t
[kW], charging(−ve) and discharging(+ve)
di(t) power consumed by the agent i at t [kW]
dC(t) power consumed by the community C at t
[kW]
esi (t) energy exported by agent i at t [kWh]
esC(t) energy exported by community C at t [kWh]
ebi (t) energy imported by agent i at t [kWh]
ebC(t) energy imported by community C at t [kWh]
bi(T ) annual bill for agent i, where T = 1 year [£]
b0i (T ) baseline annual bill for agent i without any
assets, where T = 1 year [£]
b∗i (T ) new annual bill for agent i after redistribu-
tion of savings, where T = 1 year [£]
b∗(¬)i (T ) new annual bill for agent i after redistribu-
tion of savings without network constraints,
where T = 1 year [£]
b∗(NC)i (T ) new annual bill for agent i after redistri-
bution of savings with network constraints,
where T = 1 year [£]
bC(T ) annual bill for community C, where T =
1 year [£]
bNCC (T ) annual bill for community C with network
constraints, where T = 1 year [£]
b¬C (T ) annual bill for community C without net-
work constraints, where T = 1 year [£]
5C(T ) saving of the community C after 1 year (T =
1 year) [£]
Θi(T ) marginal contribution of an agent i [£]
Γi(T ) benefits redistributed to agent i after period
T [£]
ABBREVIATIONS
ANM Active Network Management
BESS Battery Energy Storage System
CES Community Energy Storage
DERs Distributed Energy Resources
DF Depreciation Factor
DNOs Distribution Network Operators
DoD Depth of Discharge
DSM Demand Side Management
DSO Distribution System Operator
EoL End of Life
FITs Feed-in Tariffs
HES Household Energy Storage
LACE Levelized Avoided Cost of Electricity
LCOE Levelized Cost of Electricity
LV Low Voltage




RES Renewable Energy Sources
SCR Self Consumption Rate
SoC State of Charge
SRR Self Sufficiency Rate
ToU Time of Use
I. INTRODUCTION
Access to affordable renewable energy resources (RES) rep-
resents a key element of an inclusive energy transition, rep-
resented as one of the core UN sustainable development
goals [1]. Enhancing the use of locally-generated renew-
able energy can reduce the energy system contribution to
climate change [2], achieve decarburizations [3], and speed
up the transition to a low carbon economy [4]. This has led
to an exponential growth in the deployment of RES. The
increasing number of distributed energy resources (DERs)
connected to LV distribution networks is shifting the develop-
ment of energy systems towards a more decentralized struc-
ture, enabling a significant shift in market power form large
producers to individual prosumers [5].
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However, the increase in penetration of distributed gen-
eration results in new challenges for the operation of dis-
tribution networks. A key challenge with RES generators is
that they are intermittent, small-sized and distributed across
the distribution network. They are gradually transforming
networks into active and two-way energy flow networks, cru-
cially challenging the way they are traditionally designed and
managed. For instance, power flows become reversed and the
distribution network is no longer a passive circuit supplying
loads but becomes an active system with power flows and
voltages determined by the local embedded generation output
as well as the loads [6]. Voltage out-of-bounds excursions
(i.e. temporary fluctuations of voltage outside safe accepted
limits, often determined by regulation) are an example of the
new challenges for the distribution system operators (DSOs)
face when managing the network in real-time.
In addition to the challenges faced by DSOs, the increasing
electricity retail prices and decreasing feed-in tariff rates
have reduced the incentives for household and business con-
sumers to invest in distributed renewable energy sources.
Still, the energy transition that has started in many countries
requires households to keep investing in renewable energy
generation. This has led to the emergence of local or com-
munity energy systems where household and business pro-
sumers aim to maximize behind-the-meter self-consumption
from local renewable generation to make DERs more prof-
itable [7]. An energy community is made up of a number
of individual prosumers connected to a low-voltage distribu-
tion network, usually behind the same primary sub-station.
Prosumer assets (i.e. renewable generation capacity and stor-
age) can be either distributed at individual households or
centrally installed and thus shared within the community.
Hence, this requires new control techniques for the optimiza-
tion of self-consumption in energy community microgrids
subjected to physical network and operational constraints [8].
Therefore, there is an increasing interest from academia and
industry in designing, analysing and assessing the community
energy schemes, against criteria such as scalability, efficiency
and resiliency.
Recently, several community energy projects have
emerged in the UK, the EU and worldwide. For instance,
In the UK, Community Energy Scotland (a key local orga-
nization supporting the development community energy
projects) lists more than 300 community energy projects
on their website [9]. Similar rising trends in smart energy
community initiatives can be seen across the United States
(such as the Brooklyn Microgrid project [10]), and across
Europe (refer [11] for an overview).
A crucial aspect of a community energy models and
projects is that they often involves sharing of some joint
resources and assets. One approach is to facilitate peer-
to-peer (P2P) trading in the case of individually-owned assets,
whereas another approach consists in creating a community
energy coalition in the case of community-owned assets,
where an aggregator or community energy operator dis-
tributes the benefits within the community. A successful
example of such a scheme is the ‘‘Ecovillage’’ of Findhorn
in Scotland, UK [12]. Despite the fact that number of energy
communities has witnessed a rapid increase, there is still
a considerable gap in both existing research and practice
regarding what are the optimal and fair methods to redis-
tribute the energy outputs (and hence financial benefits) from
the jointly community-owned assets to their members.
The physical network (the LV distribution grid) is an essen-
tial entity that allows the exchange of energy in the settings
of the energy communities. However, an important aspect
that has often been neglected in existing research on energy
community models is the relevance of the distribution grid’s
technical limits. Installation of renewable generator (solar
PV/wind turbine) or batteries in the grid changes power flows,
and might create congestions, voltage excursions, or line
over-heating. In such cases, the grid operator might con-
sider the need for an Active Network Management (ANM)
to remotely control the injection of distributed renewable
generator and storage assets. Therefore, due to this con-
gestion/voltage excursion, assets might be prevented from
exporting/consuming to/from the grid, reducing the benefits
from their owners. For instance, when the grid is constrained
with voltage excursions, then the exports form PV/wind tur-
bine and exports/imports from/to battery can be curtailed as
it is currently the case in Orkney Islands [13], UK. Therefore,
such curtailment events need to be accounted for in the energy
community setting by including power flow (physical net-
work/grid constraints) in the techno-economic analysis. For
example, in most of the prior literature, the studied models of
energy communities do not consider the impact of physical
network constraints in the assessment of the techno-economic
benefits of community-owned energy assets compared to
individually-owned energy assets.
Furthermore, although most prior literature sources show
that community-owned battery storage system offers higher
benefits as compared to individually-owned distributed bat-
teries [7], [14]–[17], these studies often do not consider
battery degradation cost. Also, although higher benefits can
be achieved by investing in community assets, how to redis-
tribute these benefits among the individual households in the
community still remains a key open question, of both research
and practical interest. Current energy communities usually
employ algorithms based on proportionality of consumption
to redistribute the benefits from the community-owned gen-
erator assets. However, such methods are not fair, and not
applicable in the case of energy storage assets, where the
proportionality of the asset usage does not apply. Hence,
there is a need to design an efficient and fair redistribution
mechanisms that applies to both community-owned renew-
able generator and storage assets, while incorporating the
asset’s degradation, and the physical network and operational
constraints.
In this paper, to address the above challenges, we propose
a model that first studies the techno-economic benefits of
community-owned assets versus individually-owned energy
assets considering the network/grid constraints. In order to
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assess the benefits from installing various assets including
a comprehensive model of battery degradation, we propose
an approach based on real time-series data of a community,
and compare the benefits provided by community-owned
assets with the benefits expected from individually-owned
assets, considering operational network constraints. Then,
using the methodology and principles from cooperative game
theory [18], we propose a redistribution model for benefits
in a community based on marginal value, a key concept in
cooperative ( or coalitional) game theory.
In the context of decentralized energy systems, coalitional
game theory has been identified as a promising solution
for designing incentive mechanisms for community energy
trading and sharing. In a cooperative game, players form
coalitions to maximise a common objective for mutual ben-
efit. Then, the benefit is distributed equally or fairly among
themselves using incentive-based solution concepts, such as
the Shapley value. Existing coalitional game theory redis-
tribution mechanism based on concepts like the Shapley
value use marginal contributions at their core, but present
issues of scalability as the number of agents in a coalition
increases [19], [20]. Moreover, most of existing redistribu-
tion frameworks are developed without considering network
constraints, in which case the computation cost becomes even
more challenging. To address this computational challenge,
we propose in this paper a more computationally tractable
(and hence more practically applicable) redistribution mech-
anism based on the marginal contribution of each agent (in
our case household) of the community. In detail, the main
contribution of the paper can be summarized as follows:
• Weprovide a techno-economic comparison between two
configurations of energy communities connected to a
low-voltage distribution network. First, a configuration
with individually-owned distributed energy assets, such
as solar PV and residential batteries. Then, a second
configuration in which distributed energy assets are
jointly owned by the community, and installed in a single
location. The proposed two configurations of energy
communities are compared by studying the economic
impacts of installing various energy assets on the grid
for both fixed and dynamic time of use (ToU) tariffs.
• We incorporate power flow (physical network/grid con-
straints), and physical battery degradation into com-
munity energy optimization models, including the
effect of network constraints on redistribution schemes.
To achieve this, we employ a battery state of health
degradation model based on the battery depth of dis-
charge in each control cycle, while maintaining the bus
voltages within the permissible limits. This represents
a considerable extension of prior work of control and
sharing of assets in energy communities, which do not –
or very rarely consider physical LV network constraints
in their modeling (including the model in the authors’
own prior work [21])
• We investigate and propose a fair and computationally
tractable redistribution scheme for sharing the benefits
obtained from community-owned energy assets sub-
jected to physical network constraints, based on prin-
ciples from cooperative game [18], [19], and test its
advantageous by comparing with the state-of-the-art
redistribution mechanism.
• The proposed energy community model is validated
using a real case study from the ReFLEX (Responsive
Flexibility) project that aims to develop a large-scale
demonstrator for community energy integration in
Orkney, Scotland, UK [22].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
Section II discusses relevant literature on state-of-the-art
research that models energy communities and sate-of-
the-art approaches for redistribution benefits from commu-
nity owned assets. Energy community network modeling
along with battery and voltage control mechanism, assess-
ment of energy community efficiency, and mechanism for
fair redistribution of benefits from community-owned assets
to individual households methodologies are presented in
Section III. Results of the techno-economic analysis of
community-owned assets versus individually-owned assets,
and the various redistribution schemes of benefits achieved
from community assets are presented in Section IV. Finally,
Section V concludes and elaborates on future work.
II. RELATED WORK
A. STATE OF ART IN ENERGY COMMUNITY MODELING
Energy community schemes are a fast-growing area of
research that have gained increased attention in the litera-
ture. For instance, the relevant literature identified using the
Scopus search engine shows that the number of scientific
publications on the subject has seen an increasing order
of magnitude (around 10 times), between 2011 and 2020,
as shown in Fig. 1. The Scopus search engine is the largest
abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature.
The queries used in the search engine are: ‘‘Energy AND
Communities’’, ‘‘Local ANDEnergy System’’, ‘‘Community
AND Energy System’’. All the results obtained from Scopus’
queries have been carefully reviewed and filtered to include
the papers related to energy communities only, not just part
of the wider energy domain.
An energy community is made up of a number of pro-
sumers, who are defined to be consumers but also pro-
ducers [5]. Recently, Gjorgievski et al. [23] have reviewed
the state-of-art literature on social arrangements, techni-
cal designs and the impact of energy communities. They
have identified various gaps in the literature, and one of
the highlights closely related to our work is the need to
design a more realistic pay-off distribution among the com-
munity members for stable coalition of the energy com-
munity. Similarly, Seyfang et al. [24] have conducted a
detailed UK-wide survey on energy community projects, and
concluded that energy communities are diverse and rapidly
growing. Recently, the modeling of energy community has
gained increased attention from a social perspective focused
on niche areas of: socio-technical energy system [25], social
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FIGURE 1. Evolution of scientific publications related to energy
community.
innovations and dynamics [26], socio-technical energy tran-
sitions [27], social entrepreneurship [28], grassroots innova-
tion [29], multi-sectoral approaches [30], social acceptance
and participation [31], social investments [32] and social
factors in AI research [33]. Huang et al. [34] have reviewed
various simulation tools and models available for commu-
nity energy system planning, design and optimization. Sim-
ilarly, Mendes et al. [35] have surveyed numerous energy
optimization and simulation tools for integrated community
energy systems planning and analysis. Using a smart energy
and AI perspective, other works have modeled a number of
related concepts, such as Virtual Power Plant (VPP) optimisa-
tion [36]–[38], demand-side response aggregation [39]–[45],
renewable energy curtailment in remote communities [46],
[47], battery storage monitoring and optimisation [48]–[51],
and P2P energy trading and blockchains [52]–[55].
Battery energy storage systems, along with renewable
generators (solar PV, wind turbine) are the most com-
mon assets considered in the existing energy commu-
nity models. In energy communities, individual households
can invest in their own energy assets (renewable gener-
ation capacity and storage), or can jointly invest in the
big community-owned energy assets and can then share
energy and associated financial benefits within the commu-
nity. Hence, techno-economic assessment between energy
communities with individually-owned prosumer assets and
models with community-owned assets have recently gained
increased attention in the literature [7], [14]–[17]. Most of
the studies focus on comparing the battery storage adoption
at the individual household scale with storage adoption at the
community scale. For instance, Dong et al. [14] have com-
pared community energy storage (CES) to household energy
storage (HES). Their results indicate that both HES and CES
can improve the community self-consumption rate (SCR)
and self-sufficiency rate (SRR). HES is found more suitable
for households with lower demand profiles, while house-
holds with higher demand profiles benefit more from CES.
The same authors’ extended their study by comparing the
performance of HES and CES with demand side manage-
ment (DSM) under ToU pricing scheme [7]. CES is found
to be more effective at improving self-consumption for con-
sumers and shaving peak demand for network operators. Sim-
ilarly, Stelt et al. [15] have evaluated the techno-economic
analysis of HES and CES for residential prosumers. The
economic value of both HES and CES was assessed by
considering the cost of energy imported from the grid. The
results showed that both HES and CES can reduce the annual
energy costs by 22 to 30%, and improve the use of on site
PV generation by 23 to 29% compared to a baseline house-
holds without storage system. The economic feasibility of
both HES and CES is found to be largely determined by
the investment cost of the storage capacity per kWh. Similar
comparison of storage adoption at the individual household
level to storage adoption at the community level is studied by
Barbour et al. [16]. Their results show that the community
battery is better in terms of economic revenues compared
to individual household batteries, as it requires less stor-
age capacity overall and increases the self-consumption rate.
Likewise, Walker & Kwon [17] have compared the economic
and operational performance of individual and community
shared storage. Their results also showed that the shared
CES can achieve the maximum cost savings and significantly
improve the utilization of energy storage.
Recently, Koirala et al. [56] have provided an overview of
the state of the art in CES. Similarly, an overview of the eco-
nomic potential and current research on CES was outlined by
Sardi & Mithulananthan [57] and Strickland et al. [58]. The
review states that CES have a huge potential to reduce import
from the utility grid and thus maximize the self-consumption
of the community. Hence, the advantages of CES over HES
is well identified in the literature [7], [14]–[17], [59]–[64].
However, to our knowledge, most of the existing studies
on comparison of individually-owned assets versus centrally
located community-owned assets, while considering both
the renewable generation and battery, have not included the
battery degradation cost in their techno-economic analysis.
Furthermore, although community assets are found to provide
more benefits compared to individually-owned assets, still,
the question of how to allocate financial gains from shared
community-owned assets to the members of the community
is not addressed in most of the existing frameworks.
Finally, several approaches have been proposed recently to
integrate the network constraints such as electric cables ther-
mal limits and voltage excursions in the market structures and
trading strategies of the energy communities [6], [65]–[71].
However, most of the existing studies on the techno-economic
analysis of individually-owned versus community-owned
assets (including the authors’ own prior work [21]) have
not considered the network constraints. The assets might be
prevented from exporting/consuming to/from the grid due to
network constraints, thereby reducing the associated benefits.
To our knowledge, the model in this paper is the first that
considers such curtailment events in the energy community
setting by including the power flow (grid constraints) in
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the techno-economic analysis of individually-owned assets
versus community-owned assets.
B. SHARING OF ENERGY, COST, AND FINANCIAL GAIN IN
ENERGY COMMUNITIES
In the context of energy communities characterized with
renewable energy systems, coalitional game theory has
been identified as a promising solution for energy shar-
ing schemes [72], cost allocation [73], and benefit redistri-
bution [21] schemes among the community members. For
instance, Alam et al. [19] proposed an energy exchange
mechanism in rural communities that aimed to reduce battery
usage and where approximated Shapley value was used for
the distribution of benefits among the households. Although,
they have proposed that the approximated Shapley value
improves the computational time as compared to original
Shapley value, but it still possess a significant computational
challenge with the increase in the number of agents in the
coalition. Recently, Moncecchi et al. [74] have proposed a
two-level benefit distribution scheme based on coalitional
game theory. At the first level, the benefit is distributed to
a group of community members. Then, at the second level,
the benefit is distributed proportionally to individual mem-
bers. While various operational scenarios were studied, only
few players (nine community groups only) were considered
in the coalition formation. Similarly, Li [75] have proposed
a cost-sharing scheme developed according to the Shapley
value method. However, only four players are considered,
thereby raising the issue of computational tractability and
hence the practical application of the proposed redistribu-
tion mechanism is limited. Likewise, Chakraborty et al. [76]
investigated the sharing of storage systems among consumers
in a ToU pricing scheme using cooperative game theory.
Sharing mechanism is illustrated using only five households
which raises the issue of scalability and practicality as the
household number increases in the coalition. Moreover, stor-
age is considered ideal thereby neglecting the degradation
aspect of the battery. In the work of Marzband et al. [77],
cooperation among energy communities was studied in order
to reduce the annual electricity cost, and profit redistribu-
tion mechanisms based on various solution concepts from
cooperative game theory such as, Shapley, Nucleolus, and
Merge and Split are proposed. Various energy, cost, and
profit redistribution schemes based on coalitional game the-
ory can also be found in [78]–[82]. However, one of the
major challenges in redistribution schemes based on coali-
tion game theory is the issue of scalability. Specifically,
when determining the solution concepts such as Shapley
values in a coalition, the computation becomes highly com-
plex and time-consuming as the number of players increases
in the coalition. Moreover, most of the existing redistribu-
tion frameworks are developed without considering network
constraints, in which case the computation becomes more
challenging. Thus, there is still a need to develop a redistri-
bution mechanism that is fair, but also provide tractable com-
putational performance that scales well with the increasing
number of members in the energy community coalition, while
considering operational network constraints.
To address these limitations, we propose a study that first
confirms the techno-economic benefits of community-owned
assets versus individually-owned energy assets considering
the network/grid constraints. Then, the novel fair redistri-
bution mechanism introduced in our earlier work [21] is
extended to include network operational constraints while
being computationally tractable, and hence more practically
applicable. In order to assess the benefits from installing
various assets while including a comprehensive model of
battery degradation, we propose an approach based on real
time-series data of a community, and compare the bene-
fits provided by community-owned assets with the benefits
expected from individual assets, considering operational net-
work constraints. In the next section, we present the energy
community modeling approach.
III. METHODS
A. ENERGY COMMUNITY MODEL
In this work, we first aim to compare two configurations
of energy communities. One configuration will consider the
community as 200 individual agents, each one of them with
his own consumption and local production, but without finan-
cial nor energy interaction between them. In such config-
uration, agents import electricity from the grid when their
assets cannot cover their own consumption, whereas they
can export electricity to the grid when they have production
surplus. The second configuration corresponds to the case
of an energy community in which agents invest together in
community-owned assets, such as wind or solar production,
and community batteries. The demand of agents is considered
inflexible. A renewable generator (either wind turbine or a
solar PV installation), a battery energy storage system and
the utility grid are the three power sources considered for
satisfying the inflexible demand at all times. A power flow
diagram of an agent or of the energy community considered
as a whole is shown in Fig. 2.
FIGURE 2. Power flow diagram of the energy community model.
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FIGURE 3. Overview of the energy community modeling approach.
We consider an energy community, composed of a group
of individual prosumers (agents) connected to a low-voltage
distribution network. To model a group of 200 individual
prosumers, we consider that each individual has a consump-
tion and a production from solar PV rooftop panel. Con-
sumption data are half hourly demand profiles extracted from
the dataset provided by the Thames Valley Vision End Point
Monitor [83] project. We define, the community C as the set
of all agents i, and is defined as C = {Ai | i ∈ [1,N ]} where
N = 200 agents in our case.
The overall power balance at any given time t of an agent
i or of the energy community C is given by:





where gwind/solari/C (t) is the power generated by the renewable
generator, that can be individually owned, or owned by the
community. pgridi/C (t) represents the power that an agent or
that the community can buy/sell from/to the grid. pbati/C(t)
represents the power of the storage system (individually-
owned, or centrally located and owned by the community),
which is considered negative when the battery is charging
(battery considered as a load), and positive when the battery
is discharging (battery considered as a generator). di/C(t)
is the power consumed by an agent or by the community
considered as a whole, i.e the aggregated demand power
of 200 agents.
However, the power flow diagram proposed in Fig. 2
does not include physical constraints such as electric cables
thermal limits and voltage excursions. Therefore, in energy
communities with important renewable production, such as
the Orkney Islands considered in the ReFLEX project [22],
agents may be prohibited from exporting power at particu-
lar times, due to electric cables overheat. As a result, grid
constraints must also be added to the model described above.
This proposed energy community modeling approach is sum-
marized in Fig. 3. We start first by modeling the power flows
in an LV network describing the energy community in the
following section.
B. LV NETWORK MODEL
To include physical constraints such as network constraints,
we have considered a 13-bus radial distribution system to
connect all agents of the community. This network model
is adapted from the IEEE 13-bus network [84]. We first
aim to compare two configurations of energy communities.
First, a configuration with individually-owned distributed
generation assets, such as solar PV and residential batteries.
Households are randomly aggregated among the 13-buses,
as presented in Fig. 4. Then, a second configuration in which
distributed generation assets are owned by the community,
and installed in a single location. Fig. 5 shows the location
of assets and households in the configuration of centrally
located, community-owned generation and storage assets.
Community-owned assets are connected to a unique bus
without load, that was chosen to be in a central location of
the grid, in order to reduce the risk of constraining the grid.
Bus 1 represents themain connection to the transmission grid,
and its voltage is set to reference voltage of 1 p.u with the base
voltage of 236 V.
Power flow in this 13 bus grid model is computed for
every time interval considered in our simulations in order
to determine the voltages and power (active and reactive)
flowing at every bus. The power flow computation follows
a power approach in which the apparent power balance is
stated for every bus of the grid. We define, Sn = Pn + jQn
the apparent power that is consumed or produced at bus n.
Znk = Rnk + jXnk is the impedance of the line between bus n
and bus k and Snk = Pnk +Qnk is the apparent power flowing
between bus n and bus k . The power balance equations are
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FIGURE 4. Electric network used in simulations with grid constraints for individually-owned
assets.
FIGURE 5. Electric network used in simulations with grid constraints for centrally located
community-owned assets.








|Vk | |Ynk | sin(δk − δn + γnk ) (2)
where Ynk = Ynkejγnk is the admittance of the line connection
between bus n and bus k . Pn is the total active power pro-
duced and consumed at bus n, which is considered positive if
produced and negative if the power is consumed. Similarly,
Qn is the total reactive power produced (positive) and con-
sumed (negative) at bus n. The voltage at bus n is defined
by Vn = Vnejδn , with δn the voltage angle. The power balance
expressed in Eq. (2) is solved using the Newton-Raphson
method, and gives the following two fundamental outputs:
i The voltage at each bus, in amplitude and phase.
ii The power (active and reactive) flowing through each
bus.
Furthermore, in order to provide a techno-economic study
that enables the comparison between the two configura-
tions proposed (individually-owned and community-owned
assets), we considered one year of data for load consump-
tion [83] and solar PV production [85] with half-hourly time
intervals, using Thames Valley Vision data. Power flows were
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computed for thewhole year. Also, we have linearly increased
the power consumption of each household in order to consider
an energy community in which voltage profiles are already
close but still within the UK’s upper and lower admissible
voltage limits of 1.1 per unit (p.u) and 0.94 p.u. respectively
for the whole year. Therefore, this setting consists in a case
of normal operation with acceptable voltage and congestion
profiles, while allowing us to study the potential impacts of
installing various assets on the grid.
Indeed, the addition of solar PV or batteries in the LV
grid changes power flows, and might create congestions or
voltage excursions (i.e temporary fluctuations of voltage out-
side safe accepted limits). In such cases, the grid operator
might consider the need for an ANM, that allows him to
remotely control the injection of distributed generation assets.
Therefore, due to this congestion/voltage excursion, assets
might be prevented from exporting/consuming to/from the
grid, reducing the benefits from their owners. For instance,
when the grid is constrained with voltage excursions, then
the exports form PV and exports/imports from/to battery are
curtailed. This is why such curtailment events need to be
accounted for in the energy community setting by including
power flow (grid constraints) in the techno-economic anal-
ysis of individually-owned assets versus community-owned
assets. The control algorithm of distributed generation assets,
including the remote control from the Distribution System
Operator (DSO) to prevent voltage out-of-bounds excursions,
is defined in the following section.
C. BATTERY CONTROL ALGORITHM WITH VOLTAGE
CONTROL MECHANISM
A battery control scheme consists of operational real-time
decisions to charge or discharge the battery, based on the
difference between the agent/community power consumption
and its PV production. When the PV production exceeds the
power consumed, the control scheme charges the battery if the
bus voltage (V bus) is within the permissible limits (0.94 p.u ≤
V bus ≤ 1.1 p.u), until it reaches the full capacity. Any excess
is exported and sold to the main grid, provided the V bus is
within the permissible limits. Whenever, the demand exceeds
the PV production, the battery is discharged until it reaches its
maximum allowable depth of discharge (DoD), provided the
V bus is within the permissible limits. Any remaining deficit
is purchased and imported from the grid. The bus voltage is
regulated within the safe permissible limits by controlling the
export from the PV generator, and export/import from/to the
battery assets.
The operation of the battery is constrained by the state of
charge (SoC) levels, and a maximum power (pbat,max) that the
battery can be charged or discharged at, which corresponds
to its maximum C-rating. In this work, Coulomb-counting
method is used to estimate the SoC of the battery. The accu-
racy of this method depends mainly on how the current drawn
from or to the battery is measured and on the nominal battery
capacity [86]. In our study, the nominal battery capacity is
updated at regular intervals of the simulation. This approach
is similar to the solutions implemented in commercial
batteries.1
At any given time t of a charging phase, the battery is
charged with an efficiency (ηc) until it reaches the max-
imum battery capacity (SoCmax). Charging constraints are
defined as:
SoC(t) ≤ SoCmax (3)
pbat(t) ≤ pbat,max (4)
Similarly, the battery can be discharged with an efficiency
(ηd ) until it reaches its minimum battery capacity (SoCmin).
Discharging constraints are defined as:
SoC(t) ≥ SoCmin (5)
pbat(t) ≤ pbat,max (6)
The minimum battery capacity corresponds to the maxi-
mum allowable DoD.
In this section, we propose a heuristic-based battery con-
trol algorithm that aims to charge the battery when there is
excess of power, and discharge the battery when there is a
deficit of power, while maintaining the bus voltage (V bus)
within the permissible limits. The algorithm can be described
as follows:
If gPV(t) > d(t), there is excess of power generated from
the PV generator. The control strategy of the battery dictates
the following:
I Excess power is stored in the battery (charging oper-
ation), provided the V bus(t) due to bus power Pbus(t)
is within the permissible limits. Pbus(t) is the total net
active and reactive power of the bus at time t given by
Eq. (2).
II If the battery is full or if available power is
greater than the maximum acceptable charging power,
the agent/community sells the excess power to the util-
ity grid at a selling price equal to τ s(t), provided the
V bus(t) due to bus power Pbus(t) is within the permis-
sible limits.
The resulting SoC profile, power at bus Pbus(t), and the
energy exported es(t) to the grid during the identified
duration of excess generation are determined as:
pbat(t) = min(min([gPV(t)− d(t)], pbat,max),
[SoCmax − SoC(t − 1)]
ηc1t
)
⇐H 0.94p.u ≤ V bus(t) ≤ 1.1p.u (7)
SoC(t) = SoC(t − 1)+ ηcpbat(t)1t (8)






⇐H 0.94p.u ≤ V bus(t) ≤ 1.1p.u (10)
where1t corresponds to the duration of the considered
time step.
1 A number of commercial battery manufacturers such as ABB [87]
propose an updated Coulomb-counting method for SoC estimation.
VOLUME 9, 2021 112027
S. Norbu et al.: Modeling Economic Sharing of Joint Assets in Community Energy Projects
III If the excess PV power available for charging the bat-
tery or for export to grid violates the safe voltage limit,
then the power export from the PV, and power import
to battery are curtailed (Pcurtailed) until the voltage is
within the permissible limits, accordingly the Pbus(t)
is updated. When the generation from the PV is cur-
tailed due to voltage violations, the demand is satisfied
by importing energy (eb(t)) from the utility grid at a
buying price equal to τ b(t).
Whenever the V bus(t) > 1.1 p.u, the voltage is con-
trolled as follows.
i If the battery is fully charged, then the export from
PV is curtailed and the bus power is updated as:
Pbus(t) = Pbus(t)− Pcurtailed (11)
If the updated Pbus(t) > 0, then the excess energy






If the updated Pbus(t) < 0, then the deficit energy






ii If the battery is in the process of charging, then
the power export from PV and power import
to battery are curtailed, and the bus power is
updated as:
pbat(t) = min(min([pbat(t)+Pcurtailed], pbat,max),
[SoCmax − SoC(t − 1)]
ηc1t
) (14)
Pbus(t) = gPV(t)− pbat(t) (15)
If the updated Pbus(t) > 0, then the excess energy






If the updated Pbus(t) < 0, then the deficit energy






Similarly, if gPV(t) < d(t), then there is a deficit in power
supplied by the PV generator. During this time, the demand
is satisfied by discharging the battery, provided the battery
capacity is above the minimum SoC and the bus voltage
(V bus) is within the permissible limits. Otherwise, the deficit
power is imported from the utility grid. A flowchart of the
proposed control strategy is shown in Fig. 6. Algorithm 1
outlines this heuristic if-then rule based control strategy.
Most of the time the voltage excursion is characterized
predominantly by over-voltage phenomenon (i.e high voltage
violations V bus(t) > 1.1 p.u). Hence, the voltage control
mechanism for the case with V bus(t) > 1.1 p.u is only
included in the control scheme. However, if the bus voltage
violates the lower permissible limit (V bus(t) < 0.94 p.u) and
gPV(t) > d(t), then the bus voltage can be controlled by
limiting the battery charging until it is within the permissible
limit. If gPV(t) < d(t), then the bus voltage can be con-
trolled by increasing the reactive power production from the
battery.
Whenever the bus voltage (V bus) violates the permissible
limits, then the gird is constrained, hence the exports from
PV and exports/imports from/to battery are curtailed. This
reduces the financial benefits offered by the assets. The
economic parameters to assess and compare the benefits of
community-owned assets with individually-owned assets is
presented in the next section.
D. ASSESSMENT OF ENERGY COMMUNITY EFFICIENCY
Themain aim of the economic study of the energy community
is to determine the benefits provided by assets (renewable
generation capacity and storage) to prosumers, subjected to
network and operational constraints. To achieve this, the pre-
sented algorithm 1 is implemented by considering the differ-
ent pricing schemes. A yearly energy bill savings, which is
a fairly intuitive indicator, is used to compare the economic
performance of investments in individually-owned assets and
community-owned assets. In this section, we provide the
key economic performance indicator adopted in the proposed
comparative study.
1) PRICING SCHEMES OF THE COMMUNITY
In this study, we did not consider the feed in tariff, and con-
sidered two types of pricing schemes for energy imports from
the main utility grid. Export tariff to the grid was not included
as many developed countries worldwide (such as the UK
or the EU), guaranteed feed-in-tariffs (FITs) for renewable
electricity generated by small DERs are being phased out as
a support mechanism, i.e. they are gradually reduced or are
well below retail tariffs available from large operators [15].
For instance, in the UK, FITs are no longer available to
producers of any size since 31st March 2019 [88]. A fixed and
a dynamic ToU import tariffs were considered as described
below:
• Fixed tariff: a fixed tariff of 16 pence/kWhwas adopted
after comparing the fixed electricity prices offered by
various UK-based electricity suppliers using web-tools
in price comparison site Money Supermarket [89]. This
website is one of the several price comparison sites
approved and accredited by the Office of Gas and Elec-
tricity Markets (Ofgem) [90], the government regulator
for the electricity and downstream natural gas markets
in UK.
• Dynamic tariff (ToU): the dynamic ToU tariff was
based on Agile Octopus [91] offered by Octopus Energy,
a UK-based electricity supplier. Agile Octopus tar-
iff consist of a maximum price of 35 pence/kWh,
an average price of 15.9 pence/kWh, and a minimum
of 2.8 pence/kWh. Both the fixed and dynamic ToU
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FIGURE 6. Flowchart of battery and voltage control scheme.
pricing schemes corresponds to real tariffs applied
in 2020.
2) TECHNO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS
The economic value of both community-owned assets and
individually-owned assets can be assessed and compared by
considering the reduction of the sum of the annual elec-
tricity bill of all the households from the energy commu-
nity. The yearly bill b(T ) of an agent/community can be
expressed as the sum of the cost of the annual energy con-
sumption and the depreciation cost of the assets cA, minus








es(t)τ s(t)+ cA(T ) (18)
where the energy import eb(t) at time step t is given by
Eq. (19), with Phouse the power imported (if positive) or
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Algorithm 1: Battery and Voltage Control Algorithm
1 Input: gPV(t), d(t), τ b(t),τ s(t),ηc, ηd , SoC initial, SoCmax, SoCmin, pbat,max
2 Set: V slack bus =1 p.u
3 for t = 1 : T do
4 ∀t ∈ [0,T ], excess of energy or deficit in energy is determined
5 if gPV(t) ≥ d(t) then









[SoCmax − SoC(t − 1)]
ηc1t
)
⇐H 0.94 p.u ≤ V bus(t) ≤ 1.1 p.u
7 SoC(t) = SoC(t − 1)+ ηcpbat(t)1t





1t ⇐H 0.94 p.u ≤ V bus(t) ≤ 1.1 p.u
10 while V bus(t) > 1.1 p.u do
11 if pbat(t) ≥ pbat,max || SoC(t) ≥ SoCmax then
12 Pbus(t) = Pbus(t)− Pcurtailed























[SoCmax − SoC(t − 1)]
ηc1t
)
20 Pbus(t) = gPV(t)− pbat(t)


























SoC(t − 1)− SoCmin
])
⇐H 0.94 p.u ≤ V bus(t) ≤ 1.1 p.u










33 while V bus(t) > 1.1 p.u do
34 if pbat(t) ≤ 0 || SoC(t) ≤ SoCmin then




















SoC(t − 1)− SoCmin
])










45 Output: ∀t ∈ [0,T ], SoC(t), input to rainflow cycle counting algorithm used to calculate the battery depreciation
factor, es(t) energy exported to utility grid, eb(t) energy imported from grid, Pbus(t) bus power, and V bus(t) bus voltage
profile.







However, as many countries have reduced or removed
export prices under the form of feed-in tariffs, our
analysis will not include revenues from energy export.
Thus, the yearly bill without feed-in tariff is determined
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eb(t)τ b(t)+ cA(T ) (21)
cA represents the depreciation cost which is due to the usage
of the asset within the considered period. For example, for a
considered period T equal to one year in which the asset is
used following the manufacturer’s recommendations, cA(T )




Life time (in years)
(22)
In the techno-economic analysis, the battery depreciation
cost can be greater or equal to the depreciation cost men-
tioned in batteries manufacturer specifications, the depreci-
ation can be greater if the useful lifetime is small. A bat-
tery useful lifetime depends on the frequency and depth
of charge/discharge cycles during the battery’s operation.
Frequent charging and discharging operations lead to cyclic
ageing and incurs an extra cost as it accelerates the depre-
ciation of the battery and reduces its useful lifetime. This
translates into an impact on the total cost of operation and
maintenance of the battery, especially as energy storage is one
of the most expensive component of hybrid energy systems
composed of renewable generation and storage assets. In the
cyclic operation of the battery, a cycle is defined to have been
completed when the battery depth of discharge (DoD) has
returned to the starting point of the cycle. Furthermore, regu-
lar and irregular cycles can also be distinguished depending
on the starting and ending SoC of the cycle, as defined
below:
• Regular cycles: in this cycling process the starting SoC
is 100%, then it is discharged to a certain SoC cor-
responding to a specific DoD and recharged back to
100% SoC. For example, 100% SoC-to-60% SoC-back
to 100% SoC corresponds to 40% DoD cycle.
• Irregular cycles: in this case, the starting SoC is other
than 100% SoC, i.e. cycles start at any arbitrary SoC
value. For example, 70% SoC-to-30% SoC-back to 70%
SoC, which also corresponds to a 40% DoD discharge
cycle, relative to the starting SoC.
In both cases, the DoD may be same, but the battery degrada-
tion is sensitive to the starting SoC. An important aspect to be
noted here is that the number of cycles versus DoD specified
in manufacturer data-sheets are based on regular cycles only.
But, in real-life applications, the battery can hardly run on
regular cycles from 100% SoC to a specific DoD. Hence,
an important characteristics when integrating battery storage
degradation in the economic analysis, is to assess the impacts
of irregular cycles.
In this paper, a detailed Lithium-ion battery degradation
model developed in our previous work [21] is used to deter-
mine the battery depreciation factor (DF) to estimate the
battery useful lifetime. In the model, the useful life of the
battery is estimated by considering the cyclic degradation
due to both regular and irregular cycles. The rainflow cycle
counting algorithm is used to count regular and irregular
cycles by considering the SoC profile generated from the
battery control algorithm 1. The depreciation factor (DF) is
expressed as follows:
DF = DFregular + DFirregular (23)
where DFregular and DFirregular correspond to the depreciation
factor for regular and irregular cycles respectively. When the
DF value is equal to 1, this means the battery has reached
its end of life (EoL), hence the battery needs to be replaced.
EoL is normally defined as a state of the battery when the
maximum capacity of the battery reduces to 80% of its rated
initial capacity.
Taking into consideration the depreciation resulting from
the battery operation, the computation of the depreciation cost
cA in Eq. (18), & (21) is updated as follows:






Life time (in years)
)
(24)
Finally, as outlined by Eq. (21), the annual bill for agent i










b(t)+ cAC(T ) (26)
where, ebi (t)τ
b(t) is the cost of energy imports from the utility
grid by agent i at time t and cAi (T ) is the depreciation cost
of the battery owned by agent i in the considered period T .
Similarly, ebC(t)τ
b(t) is the cost of energy imported from the
utility grid by the community as a whole at time t and cAC(T )
is the depreciation cost of community-owned battery for the
considered period T .
E. MECHANISM DESIGN FOR FAIR REDISTRIBUTION OF
BENEFITS FROM COMMUNITY-OWNED ASSETS TO
INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS
In the case of community owned assets, the revenues gener-
ated by the community-owned distributed generation system
(PV and battery) can be distributed to the members of the
community. However, this raises the key research question
of how to fairly redistribute the energy outputs (and hence
the financial benefits) from the community-owned assets to
the individual members of the community. In this section,
we present the fair redistribution scheme to fairly redistribute
the benefits from the community-owned assets. Also, in order
to test the advantages of the proposed redistribution mecha-
nism, we present in this section state-of-the-art redistribution
method, used in current practice in such projects, that will be
used for comparison.
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1) MARGINAL COST REDISTRIBUTION METHOD
In this section, we present a redistribution method based on
the marginal contribution of each agent, a key concept in
cooperative game theory. The marginal contributionΘi(T ) of
an agent i for the period T represents the difference that an
agent makes to the value of a given coalition in the commu-
nity. Specifically, the marginal contributionΘi(T ) is a metric
that assess howmuch each agent i contributes to the reduction
of the energy bill of the community as a whole.
Savings of the community after one year (T = 1 year),
noted as 5C(T ), are defined by the difference between the
sum of all agents annual bills before the community assets
were installed (which corresponds to the baseline scenario
without assets), and bC(T ) i.e. the energy bill for the whole
community after one year with community-owned assets.
Hence, the community savings over time period T correspond
to the bill reduction for the whole community over that




b0i (T )− bC(T ) (27)
where b0i (T ) is the baseline bill (bill without assets) for
prosumer i before any asset was installed. In order to com-
pute a fair redistribution of the community savings among
the individual agents, the contribution Θi(T ) of each agent
to these community savings is computed. To compute the
marginal contribution of an agent i, we remove agent i from
the community of 200 agents (total community), and recom-
pute the community savings of this virtual community of
199 agents (reduced community). The marginal contribution
Θi(T ) of agent i is defined as the difference between the total
community savings 5C(T ) and the savings of the reduced
community 5C\{i}(T ), as shown below:
Θi(T ) = 5C(T )−5C\{i}(T ) ∀i ∈ C (28)
where C is the community of 200 households. Once the
marginal contribution Θi(T ) is computed for all the agents,
we distribute community savings 5C(T ) among the individ-
ual agents based on the following equation:
Γi(T ) = 5C(T )
Θi(T )∑
i∈C Θi(T )
∀i ∈ C (29)
where Γi(T ) is the amount of money redistributed to agent i
after period T .
Hence, the new bill of agent i for the time period T , noted
b∗i (T ) can be computed as follows:
b∗i (T ) = b
0
i (T )− Γi(T ) ∀i ∈ C (30)
2) MARGINAL COST REDISTRIBUTION METHOD WITH
NETWORK CONSTRAINTS
The computation of the marginal cost redistribution method
in a setup that considers network constraints is computa-
tionally expensive as it requires to recompute the marginal
contribution of every agent, which requires power-flow
computation for every time step of the considered period
(e.g. one year). Hence, for larger network, the redistribution
mechanism by marginal cost redistribution method may not
be computationally tractable.
To address this computational challenge while consider-
ing the network constraints, we propose an approximation
method. First, we compute the agents i new bill b∗(¬)i (T ) for
the case without network constraints using the Eq. (30) as
expressed in Eq. (31):
b∗(¬)i (T ) = b
0
i (T )− Γi(T ) ∀i ∈ C (31)
Then, we compute the difference between community
yearly bill with network constraints (bNCC (T )) and commu-
nity yearly bill without network constraint (b¬C (T )). Finally,
the equal part of the computed difference in the bill is dis-
tributed equally among the agents by adding to the new bill
b∗(¬)i (T ) obtained using Eq. (31). Finally, the new bill of
agent i with network constraints (b∗(NC)i (T )) is determined as
expressed in Eq. (32).






where N = 200 agents (households) in our case. bdiffC is the
difference between community yearly bill considering net-
work constraints and community yearly bill without network
constraints as expressed in Eq. (33).
bdiffC = b
NC
C (T )− b
¬
C (T ) (33)
3) INSTANTANEOUS POWER REDISTRIBUTION METHOD
WITH NETWORK CONSTRAINTS
To test the advantages of the proposed marginal cost redis-
tribution method with network constraints, we compare its
benefits with the state-of-the-art instantaneous power redis-
tribution method [92]. In this method, an instantaneous PV
power gPVC (t) produced by community-owned PV generator
is distributed among individual agents based on their instan-
taneous demand di(t). In other words, the PV power allocated
to agent i at each time step is determined as:






Then, the new bill of each agent i is computed using
Eq. (25).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the results in two parts:
first, we discuss the financial benefits obtained from
community-owned assets and individually-owned assets con-
sidering the network constraints, and compare it with the case
without network constraints. Then, we propose a compar-
ison of various benefit redistribution schemes described in
Section III-E.
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TABLE 1. Sum of individual agents optimal solar PV capacities, and community optimal solar PV capacity for both the fixed tariff of 16 pence/kWh and
dynamic Agile Octopus ToU tariff.
TABLE 2. Sum of individual agents optimal battery capacities and community optimal battery capacity for both the fixed tariff of 16 pence/kWh and
dynamic Agile Octopus ToU tariff.
A. MODEL INPUT DATA
1) RENEWABLE GENERATION DATA
For the analysis we have used a real solar radiation data
from the UK Met Office Integrated Data Archive System
(MIDAS) [85] provided by British Atmospheric Data Cen-
tre (BADC). The MIDAS dataset consists of meteorological
observations from weather stations located at various parts of
the UK. The hourly solar radiation data obtained in kJ/m2
was converted to W/m2, then it was normalized to generate
solar PV power in Watts (W). Finally, one hour resolution
data was converted to half hourly data using double spline
interpolation function, to make it compatible with the resolu-
tion of the demand data.
2) UNITARY COST OF ASSETS
A battery cost of 150 £/kWh was assumed in this
work based on 2020 Lithium-ion battery forecasts esti-
mated by BloombergNEF [93], [94]. According to
BloombergNEF [94] and PV Europe-Energy Storage [95],
battery costs are expected to drop even further in the fol-
lowing years with an estimated cost of less than $100/kWh
expected in 2023. The chosen battery cost of 150 £/kWh
for the year 2020 is consistent with the Lithium-ion battery
cost forecasts for 2021 and 2025 published in the McKinsey
quarterly report [96]. A cost of 1100 £/kW for solar PV
generation capacity was assumed based on the production
and installation cost of solar PV according to EIA, Annual
Energy Outlook 2021 [97]. This cost reflects the average
values of levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) and levelized
avoided cost of electricity (LACE) for solar PV generating
technologies entering service in 2025.
B. OPTIMAL SIZING OF ASSETS
First, it is necessary to determine the capacity of assets
installed. In this study, we chose to use an optimal size for
both individual assets and community assets. An optimal size
of PV or battery corresponds to the size that provides the
minimal simple payback period. First, we have considered
solar PV assets sizing without any storage. Then, we deter-
mined the optimal battery size for each agent and for the com-
munity. Therefore, for both assets types (PV and batteries),
we considered investment cost and degradation due to their
operation. Results of the optimal assets sizing are shown in
Table 1 for PV, and Table 2 for battery. The computation of the
simple payback period for each asset is based on simulations
using the battery control algorithm 1 for one year.
The potential impacts of installing these various assets
(with optimal capacities ) on the grid, and the corresponding
economic analysis is presented in the following section.
C. ECONOMIC COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL VERSUS
COMMUNITY ASSETS
As a reminder, the 13-bus grid model for the 200 households
community with optimal capacity assets (as shown in Table 1
& 2 ) is shown in Fig. 4 & 5 as described in Section III-B.
Yearly bus voltages are computed every half-hour of the year
by running power flow simulation over the network, with
the given consumption and production profiles. Based on
these voltage profiles, the impact of considering the grid on
the profitability of DERs and battery energy storage sys-
tem (BESS) is studied under various scenarios. The scenarios
correspond to different assets installation schemes in the net-
work. The yearly bills are computed under the various scenar-
ios considering the network constraints, and then compared
with the yearly bills computed without network constraints
in order to assess how grid constraints can impact the deploy-
ment of individual and community owned assets. Yearly bills
are computed for both the fixed tariff of 16 pence/kWh
using [89] and dynamic ToUAgile Octopus [91] tariff pricing
schemes under various scenarios as presented below:
1) SCENARIO 1: WITHOUT ANY LOCAL RENEWABLE
GENERATION OR BATTERY ASSETS
In this scenario, we only consider the demand of house-
holds, without any assets. This setting defines a baseline
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TABLE 3. Economic comparison of individually-owned and community-owned assets under baseline scenario 1 (without assets) for both the fixed tariff
of 16 pence/kWh and dynamic Agile Octopus ToU tariff.
scenario, against which the other scenarios can be com-
pared. The yearly bills with network constraints under this
baseline scenario are computed for both the fixed and ToU
tariffs, and compared with the yearly bills computed without
network constraints. Table 3 shows the sum of individual
agents annual bills and the community annual bill determined
without any assets.
As described in Section III-B, in the baseline scenariowith-
out any assets, the grid is not constrained as there is no voltage
excursion nor cable overloading. Hence, the sum of individual
annual bills and community annual bill are equal for both
cases with and without network constraints. Furthermore,
it can be observed that without assets, the community annual
bill is equal to the sum of individual annual bills, which is
expected as the community represents the aggregated demand
profiles of the individual households, and there are no local
renewable generation or battery storage assets.
2) SCENARIO 2: WITH SOLAR PV RENEWABLE GENERATOR
ASSET ONLY WITHOUT BATTERY
In this scenario, we consider the demand of households, with
renewable generator asset only, without battery storage (in
the experiments in this paper, the renewable generation is
shared solar, but the model is general, hence this could also
be a shared community wind turbine). The yearly bills with
network constraints under this scenario are computed for both
the fixed and ToU tariffs, and compared with the yearly bills
computed without network constraints. Table 4 shows the
sum of individual agents annual bills and community annual
bill obtained under this scenario.
Fig. 7 shows the yearly voltage profiles of the buses
obtained for the networkwith individually distributed optimal
solar PV’s. We can see that there is a rise in voltage during
the summer months due to high power production from solar
PV,whereas voltages reduces during thewintermonths. How-
ever, the rise in the voltage is within the permissible limits.
Hence, the exports from individual PV’s are not curtailed.
Thus, the sum of individual yearly bills computed with net-
work constraints and without network constraints are equal
(as shown in Table 4 ).
Unlike the case of individual assets, Fig. 8 shows the yearly
voltage profiles of the buses obtained for the network with
centrally located community-owned, optimally-sized solar
PV, if the grid was not curtailing any asset. We can see that
if there is no control from the grid operator, the bus voltages
FIGURE 7. Yearly buses voltage profiles of the network with
individually-owned optimal PV’s without battery.
FIGURE 8. Yearly buses voltage profiles of the network with
community-owned optimal PV only without voltage control mechanism.
rise above 1.1 p.u the highest permissible limit (0.94 p.u ≤
V bus ≤ 1.1 p.u). In practice, the grid operator would not
allow such voltage excursions, and may curtail assets export-
ing too much power. In this case, the grid will curtail the
community-owned asset every-time the voltage rise above
1.1 p.u. Fig. 9 shows the voltage profile of the buses after
implementing the voltage controlmechanism by grid operator
as described in Section III-C.
This curtailment reduces the financial benefits offered by
the community-owned solar PV. It can be observed in Table 4
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TABLE 4. Economic comparison of individually-owned and community-owned assets under scenario 2 (PV only without battery) for both the fixed tariff
of 16 pence/kWh and dynamic Agile Octopus ToU tariff.
FIGURE 9. Yearly buses voltage profiles of the network with
community-owned optimal PV only after implementing the voltage
control mechanism.
that when the network constraints is considered the com-
munity annual bill increases by £2223 for flat tariff and by
£3217 for ToU tariff compare to the case without network
constraints. Thus, the overall saving of the energy community
is reduced when grid operations are considered.
3) SCENARIO 3: WITH BOTH SOLAR PV RENEWABLE
GENERATOR AND BATTERY STORAGE ASSETS
In this scenario, we consider the demand of households,
with both renewable generator and the battery storage assets.
The yearly bills with network constraints under this sce-
nario are computed for both the fixed and ToU tariffs, and
compared with the yearly bills computed without network
constraints. Table 5 shows the sum of individual agents
annual bills and community annual bill obtained under this
scenario.
Fig. 10 shows the yearly voltage profiles of the buses
obtained for the network with individually distributed opti-
mal solar PV’s and optimal batteries. Similar to scenario 2,
we can observe the rise in the bus voltages, and the seasonal
effects in the voltage profiles. In this scenario also, the rise
in the voltages are within the permissible limits. As the
voltages are within the thresholds, the grid is not constrained,
hence the exports from the individual PV’s and export/import
from/to individual batteries are not curtailed. Thus, the sum
of individual yearly bills computed with network constraints
and without network constraints are equal as the grid is not
FIGURE 10. Yearly buses voltage profiles for the scenario with
individually-owned optimal PV’s and optimal batteries.
FIGURE 11. Yearly buses voltage profiles of the network with
community-owned optimal PV and optimal battery assets without voltage
control mechanism.
constrained when both the individual PV’s and batteries are
installed (as shown in Table 5 ).
In the case with community-owned optimal PV and opti-
mal battery, Fig. 11 shows the yearly voltage profiles of
the buses obtained for the network without implement-
ing the voltage control mechanism. Similar to the Sce-
nario 2 with community PV only, the bus voltages rise
above the 1.1 p.u the highest permissible limit. In such case,
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TABLE 5. Economic comparison of individually-owned and community-owned assets under scenario 3 (both PV and battery) for both the fixed tariff
of 16 pence/kWh and dynamic Agile Octopus ToU tariff.
FIGURE 12. Yearly buses voltage profiles of the network with
community-owned optimal PV and optimal battery after implementing
the voltage control mechanism.
the grid operator will control the voltage by curtailing the
export/import from/to community-owned assets as described
in Section III-C. Fig. 12 shows the voltage profile of the buses
after implementing the voltage control mechanism.
This curtailment reduces the overall saving of the commu-
nity. This effect can be observed in Table 5, where the annual
bill with network constraints is increased by £1874 for flat
tariff and £4019 for ToU tariff as compared to yearly bill
computed without network constraints.
Overall, for the community with individually-owned
assets, the bus voltages remains within permissible limits.
As the voltages are within the thresholds, export/import
from/to the assets are not curtailed, and the bills in the sce-
narios with and without network constraints are identical.
Fig. 8 and 11 show that there are voltage excursions in the
grid when the community-owned assets are installed. In such
case, the grid operator may curtail assets exporting/importing
too much power. Hence, the community-owned assets gets
curtailed every-time the voltage rise above 1.1 p.u. It is
important to note that the voltage at bus 2 the location
of community-owned PV and battery is not controlled.
As shown in the Fig. 5, the community-owned PV and
battery are connected to bus 2 which makes the power
export being concentrated at one location, thus with the
community-owned assets the voltage rises more than in the
scenario with individually-owned assets. Whenever the volt-
age rises above the permissible limit then the exports from
FIGURE 13. Yearly generation from community-owned solar PV with and
without voltage control mechanism.
PV and exports/imports from/to battery are curtailed until the
voltage is within the threshold. In order to illustrate this cur-
tailment effect, the yearly generation from community-owned
solar PV with and without voltage control mechanism is
shown in Fig. 13.
Overall, we observe that, there is significant reduction in
the production from community-owned PV because of cur-
tailment due to voltage constraints. This reduces the financial
benefits offered by the community-owned assets and limits
the assets that can be further included in the network. Hence,
the study shows that when the network (grid) constraints are
incorporated then the benefits from the community assets are
reduced. Therefore, when considering community assets, one
should pay attention to the location of the assets and nature of
the distribution grid considered. If the community assets are
placed in a location where there is no grid issue, then there is
a higher benefit.
While considering the network constraints, even though
the benefits from the community-owned assets are reduced
due to curtailment, still community-owned assets provide a
substantially lower annual bill for both the fixed tariff and
ToU tariff pricing schemes ( as shown in Table 4 & 5).
Furthermore, these economic results were obtained with the
same unitary cost of the assets for the community-owned
as for individually-owned, which might not be the case in
real-world scenario, whereas in practice, the unitary cost of
112036 VOLUME 9, 2021
S. Norbu et al.: Modeling Economic Sharing of Joint Assets in Community Energy Projects
the community-owned asset might be lower due to economies
of the scale effect. Thus, more savings can be obtained from
community-owned assets by considering the economies of
scale in the unitary cost of the assets. Therefore, community
assets generate benefits to the community. A key research
question that still remains is how to redistribute fairly these
benefits to the community members. This will be addressed
next, in Section IV-D.
D. FAIR REDISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS ACHIEVED FROM
COMMUNITY-OWNED ASSETS
For both the cases with and without network con-
straints, results from the economic analysis described in
Section IV-C show that community-owned assets lead
to reduction in the annual electricity bill compared to
individually-owned assets. Hence, individual agents can
achieve more savings (higher benefits) by forming the com-
munity coalition and by investing in jointly-owned assets.
In this section, in order to fairly redistribute the bene-
fits obtained from community-owned assets to individual
agents, we implement the redistribution scheme introduced in
Section III-E that utilizes the marginal contribution principle
(a key concept from coalitional game theory). First, we imple-
ment for the case with community-owned generator only,
without storage asset. Then, redistribution of cost savings
from both the community-owned generator and storage is
implemented.
1) REDISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS FROM COMMUNITY
RENEWABLE GENERATOR ASSET ONLY WITHOUT BATTERY
The investment cost of community PV was assumed to be
shared equally among the agents, but the revenues are not
equally distributed. As described in Section III-E2, using
Eq. (32) the new yearly energy bills (b∗(NC)i (T )) of individ-
ual agents after redistribution of community savings from
a community-owned solar PV is computed by marginal
cost redistribution method with network constraints. This
method is the approximated version that is computationally
tractable. The new yearly bills obtained using approximated
marginal cost redistribution method are compared with the
new yearly bills obtained using marginal cost redistribution
method without approximation. The comparison between the
redistribution mechanism with approximation and without
approximation is shown in Fig. 14 for the fixed tariff and
Fig. 15 for the dynamic ToU Tariff.
For fixed tariff, the individual agents yearly bills obtained
after redistribution by approximated marginal cost redistri-
bution method is similar to results obtained by redistribu-
tion mechanism without approximation, with the correlation
coefficient of 99.99% (as shown by Fig. 14). Similarly, for
dynamic ToU tariff the results are similar with the correlation
coefficient of 99.98% (as shown by Fig. 15). Hence, while
considering the network constraints, approximated marginal
cost redistribution method can be used to redistribute the
benefits from community owned assets, as it is much more
FIGURE 14. Comparison between the individual agents yearly bills
obtained after redistribution by approximated marginal cost
redistribution method with redistribution mechanism without
approximation for a fixed tariff of 16 pence/kWh.
FIGURE 15. Comparison between the individual agents yearly bills
obtained after redistribution by approximated marginal cost
redistribution method with redistribution mechanism without
approximation for the dynamic ToU Agile Octopus tariff.
computationally tractable. In Fig. 14 & 15, on the X-axis
we order the 200 agents (households) of the considered
community in increasing order by their total annual energy
consumption. The Y-axis gives the annual energy bill of each
agent. This representation is useful to evaluate the economic
fairness in the redistribution scheme among the small and
larger consumers.
In order to test the advantages of the proposed redistri-
bution mechanism the marginal cost redistribution method
with network constraints, we compare its benefits with the
instantaneous power redistributionmethod that was described
in Section III-E3 which corresponds to the state-of-the-art
redistribution mechanism (based on current practice).
Fig. 16 shows the individual agents annual bills after redis-
tribution by marginal cost redistribution method and instanta-
neous power redistribution method in the case of the dynamic
ToU Agile Octopus [91] tariff pricing scheme. The crossover
point between the redistributed bill curves in Fig. 16 clearly
shows that, with marginal cost redistribution method 67% of
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FIGURE 16. Individual agents yearly bills after redistribution by marginal
cost redistribution method and instantaneous power redistribution
method, with network constraints for the dynamic ToU Agile Octopus
tariff.
the agents can achieve lower annual bill than instantaneous
power redistribution method (these are the lower total annual
bill, hence smaller consumers), while with state-of-the-art
method only 33% of the agents obtain lower annual bills
(hence this scheme benefits mainly larger consumers, with
larger annual demand). Hence, under the proposed marginal
cost redistribution method with network constraints, more
agents are able to decrease their annual bill than the instanta-
neous power redistribution method with network constraints.
While it is true that large consumers benefit slightly less
under our scheme (because, of course, the total community
bill is equal in both cases), these agents with higher demand
profiles are the agents who already obtain the highest bill
reduction as compared to agents with lower demand pro-
files as illustrated in the Fig. 17. Therefore, the proposed
redistribution mechanism achieves a fairer redistribution as
compared to currently practised redistribution scheme. Prac-
tically, having the 67% of agents in the community (including
many smaller consumers) also benefiting from the proposed
redistribution mechanism would lead to greater social accep-
tance, and hence more likely to join the coalition to invest in
the jointly-owned community assets.
2) REDISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS FROM BOTH THE
COMMUNITY RENEWABLE GENERATOR AND BATTERY
STORAGE ASSETS
In this scenario, the savings (benefits) achieved from both the
community-owned solar PV and community-owned battery
are redistributed by marginal cost redistribution method with
network constraints only. Investment costs for the community
energy assets were shared equally among the agents. Fig. 18
shows the individual agents annual bills after redistribution in
the case of the dynamic ToUAgile Octopus [91] tariff pricing
scheme.
In the literature, the instantaneous power redistribution
method is only used for solar power or wind, but it cannot
be used for communities with batteries, as it is not easy
to determine who used more the battery assets than others.
FIGURE 17. Individual agents yearly bills without assets (baseline), and
yearly bills after redistribution by marginal cost redistribution method
and instantaneous power redistribution method, with network
constraints for the dynamic ToU Agile Octopus tariff.
FIGURE 18. Individual agents yearly bills without assets (baseline) and
yearly bills after redistribution by marginal cost redistribution method
with network constraints for the dynamic ToU Agile Octopus tariff.
This is another key point that demonstrates the advan-
tages of the proposed redistribution mechanism based on
marginal contribution. Yet, there is still a need to redistribute
fairly the benefits obtained from jointly-owned community
renewable generator and storage assets. Hence, the pro-
posed marginal cost redistribution method based on indi-
vidual agents marginal contribution provides the equal and
fair mechanism to redistribute the energy outputs (and hence
financial benefits) from both the jointly-owned community
solar PV and battery assets.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a techno-economic mod-
eling methodology that couple’s battery control, battery
degradation, community energy from RES with LV net-
work operating constraints, with a fair redistribution opti-
misation of benefits to jointly owned assets. The control
mechanism was implemented for both fixed electricity tariffs
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and dynamic ToU tariffs to compare the benefits obtained
when an individual household invest in their own energy
assets versus investing jointly in a community-owned energy
assets. To compare the economic performance of investments
in community-owned assets and individually-owned assets,
we considered an energy community of two hundred pro-
sumers, that were all modelled by real time-series data of gen-
eration and consumption profiles from a community in UK
for a full year. We computed yearly bills resulting from the
proposed battery control algorithm and compared the yearly
bills computed with andwithout network constraints to assess
how network/grid constraints can impact the deployment of
individual and community-owned assets.
Experimental results from our study (based on real input
data from the UK) show that, overall, the operation of
individually-owned distributed assets are less impacted by
grid constraints than the operation of community-owned
assets. Indeed, when generation is not located close enough
to consumption, it might lead to local over-voltage that
could result in curtailment by the distribution system operator
of export from community-owned assets. This curtailment
reduces the overall saving of the community, which illustrates
the importance of considering the physical grid constraints
in the energy community schemes. However, even with cur-
tailment due to grid constraints, the economic comparison
between community-owned assets and individually-owned
assets still shows that community-owned assets provides bet-
ter benefits to energy communities for both tariffs schemes
studied.
Next, for energy communities with community-owned
assets, we developed a practically applicable and com-
putationally efficient redistribution mechanism to fairly
share the energy and associated financial benefits from
community-owned assets between the community members.
This redistribution mechanism is based on the marginal con-
tribution of each member, which is a key concept from coali-
tional game theory that looks at rewarding members based
on the value they provide to the community. We showed
that the proposed redistribution mechanism is applicable to
any type of community-owned assets, even storage assets;
despite the apparent difficulty to assess how each member
takes advantage of assets.
Future work will focus on extending the model to consider
new revenue flows for an energy community through partic-
ipation in the energy and ancillary services markets, such as
providing demand-side flexibility services to the distribution
system operator. Another extension is to assess how peer-
to-peer market mechanisms with individually owned assets
can increase the benefits of such community energy scheme,
and how such a setting compares to community-owned assets.
We will also consider extensions of our model that take into
account other energy vectors and assets - such as transport
and community-shared hydrogen fuel cells. In this context,
green hydrogen is increasingly being explored as a promis-
ing energy storage solution, for renewable communities with
excess renewable generation, such as those on the Orkney
Islands [98], [99].
Finally, on the more theoretical side, development of other
redistribution schemes that closely resemble or approximate
the Shapley value solution concept, but are computation-
ally tractable to compute, forms another exciting area of
research.
REFERENCES
[1] UN Sustainable Development Goals. Goal 7:Affordable and Clean
Energy. Accessed: Jun. 24, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/energy/
[2] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report. 2019–IPCC.
Accessed: Jun. 24, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.ipcc.ch/2019/
[3] UK, Energy and Indutrial Strategy, ‘‘Energy white paper: Powering our
net zero future,’’ Dept. Bus., Energy Ind. Strategy, U.K., Tech. Rep.
CCS0220144090, CP 337, Dec. 2020. [Online]. Available: http://www.
ret.gov.au/energy/facts/white_paper/Pages/energy_white_paper.aspx
[4] OurWorld in Data. Renewable Energy. Accessed: May 25, 2020. [Online].
Available: https://ourworldindata.org/renewable-energy
[5] Y. Zhou, J. Wu, and C. Long, ‘‘Evaluation of peer-to-peer energy sharing
mechanisms based on a multiagent simulation framework,’’ Appl. Energy,
vol. 222, pp. 993–1022, Jul. 2018.
[6] J. Guerrero, A. C. Chapman, and G. Verbič, ‘‘Decentralized P2P energy
trading under network constraints in a low-voltage network,’’ IEEE Trans.
Smart Grid, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 5163–5173, Sep. 2018.
[7] S. Dong, E. Kremers, M. Brucoli, R. Rothman, and S. Brown,
‘‘Improving the feasibility of household and community energy stor-
age: A techno-enviro-economic study for the UK,’’ Renew. Sustain.
Energy Rev., vol. 131, Oct. 2020, Art. no. 110009. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032120303002
[8] European Comission. (2015). Best practices on Renewable Energy
Self-consumption, SWD 141 Final, Brussels. [Online]. Available:
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/1_EN_
autre_document_travail_service_part1_v6.pdf
[9] Community Energy Scotland. Community Energy Projects & Inno-
vations. Accessed: Jun. 15, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.
communityenergyscotland.org.uk/projects.asp
[10] E. Mengelkamp, J. Gärttner, K. Rock, S. Kessler, L. Orsini, and
C. Weinhardt, ‘‘Designing microgrid energy markets: A case study: The
Brooklyn microgrid,’’ Appl. Energy, vol. 210, pp. 870–880, Jan. 2018.
[11] A. Caramizaru and A. Uihlein, Energy Communities: An Overview of
Energy and Social Innovation, vol. 30083. Luxembourg City, Luxembourg:
Publication Office European Union, 2020.
[12] Findhorn Ecovillage. Community-Owned Wind Turbines, Findhorn
Wind Park. Accessed: Jun. 16, 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://ecovillagefindhorn.org/index.php/renewable
[13] SSEN,ANM.Orkney ANM Live. Accessed: May 25, 2021. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.ssen.co.uk/ANMGeneration/
[14] S. Dong, E. Kremers, M. Brucoli, R. Rothman, and
S. Brown, ‘‘Techno-enviro-economic assessment of household
and community energy storage in the UK,’’ Energy Convers.
Manage., vol. 205, Feb. 2020, Art. no. 112330. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0196890419313378
[15] S. van der Stelt, T. AlSkaif, and W. van Sark, ‘‘Techno-economic anal-
ysis of household and community energy storage for residential pro-
sumers with smart appliances,’’ Appl. Energy, vol. 209, pp. 266–276,
Jan. 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S0306261917315337
[16] E. Barbour, D. Parra, Z. Awwad, andM. C. González, ‘‘Community energy
storage: A smart choice for the smart grid?’’ Appl. Energy, vol. 212,
pp. 489–497, Feb. 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S0306261917317713
[17] A. Walker and S. Kwon, ‘‘Analysis on impact of shared energy stor-
age in residential community: Individual versus shared energy storage,’’
Appl. Energy, vol. 282, Jan. 2021, Art. no. 116172. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261920315749
[18] G. Chalkiadakis, E. Elkind, and M. Wooldridge, ‘‘Computational aspects
of cooperative game theory,’’ Synth. Lectures Artif. Intell. Mach. Learn.,
vol. 5, no. 6, pp. 1–168, Oct. 2011.
VOLUME 9, 2021 112039
S. Norbu et al.: Modeling Economic Sharing of Joint Assets in Community Energy Projects
[19] M. Alam, S. D. Ramchurn, and A. Rogers, ‘‘Cooperative energy exchange
for the efficient use of energy and resources in remote communities,’’ in
Proc. 12th Int. Conf. Auto. Agents Multiagent Syst. (AAMAS), vol. 2, 2013,
pp. 731–738.
[20] S. S. Fatima, M. Wooldridge, and N. R. Jennings, ‘‘A linear approxi-
mation method for the Shapley value,’’ Artif. Intell., vol. 172, no. 14,
pp. 1673–1699, Sep. 2008.
[21] S. Norbu, B. Couraud, V. Robu, M. Andoni, and
D. Flynn, ‘‘Modelling the redistribution of benefits from joint investments
in community energy projects,’’ Appl. Energy, vol. 287, Apr. 2021,
Art. no. 116575. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0306261921001215
[22] European Marine Energy Centre (EMEC). ReFLEX:Responsive
FLEXbilities for Orkney Islands. Accessed: May 25, 2020. [Online].
Available: http://www.emec.org.uk/ukri-gives-green-light-to-reflex-
orkney-project-2/
[23] V. Z. Gjorgievski, S. Cundeva, and G. E. Georghiou, ‘‘Social arrange-
ments, technical designs and impacts of energy communities: A review,’’
Renew. Energy, vol. 169, pp. 1138–1156, May 2021. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960148121000859
[24] G. Seyfang, J. J. Park, and A. Smith, ‘‘A thousand flowers Blooming? An
examination of community energy in the UK,’’ Energy Policy, vol. 61,
pp. 977–989, Oct. 2013.
[25] P. Hansen, ‘‘Optimising shared renewable energy systems: An
institutional approach,’’ Energy Res. Social Sci., vol. 73, Mar. 2021,
Art. no. 101953. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S2214629621000463
[26] R. J. Hewitt, N. Bradley, A. B. Compagnucci, C. Barlagne, A. Ceglarz,
R. Cremades, M. McKeen, I. M. Otto, and B. Slee, ‘‘Social innovation in
community energy in Europe: A review of the evidence,’’ Frontiers Energy
Res., vol. 7, p. 31, Apr. 2019.
[27] D. N.-Y. Mah, ‘‘Community solar energy initiatives in urban energy tran-
sitions: A comparative study of Foshan, China and Seoul, South Korea,’’
Energy Res. Social Sci., vol. 50, pp. 129–142, Apr. 2019.
[28] S. Becker, C. Kunze, and M. Vancea, ‘‘Community energy and social
entrepreneurship: Addressing purpose, organisation and embeddedness
of renewable energy projects,’’ J. Cleaner Prod., vol. 147, pp. 25–36,
Mar. 2017.
[29] T. Hargreaves, S. Hielscher, G. Seyfang, and A. Smith, ‘‘Grassroots inno-
vations in community energy: The role of intermediaries in niche develop-
ment,’’ Global Environ. Change, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 868–880, Oct. 2013.
[30] P. McCallum, D. P. Jenkins, A. D. Peacock, S. Patidar, M. Andoni,
D. Flynn, and V. Robu, ‘‘A multi-sectoral approach to modelling commu-
nity energy demand of the built environment,’’ Energy Policy, vol. 132,
pp. 865–875, Sep. 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S0301421519304112
[31] T. Bauwens and P. Devine-Wright, ‘‘Positive energies? An empirical study
of community energy participation and attitudes to renewable energy,’’
Energy Policy, vol. 118, pp. 612–625, Jul. 2018.
[32] T. Bauwens, ‘‘Analyzing the determinants of the size of investments by
community renewable energy members: Findings and policy implications
from flanders,’’ Energy Policy, vol. 129, pp. 841–852, Jun. 2019.
[33] V. Robu, D. Flynn, M. Andoni, and M. Mokhtar, ‘‘Consider ethical and
social challenges in smart grid research,’’ Nature Mach. Intell., vol. 1,
no. 12, pp. 548–550, Dec. 2019.
[34] Z. Huang, H. Yu, Z. Peng, and M. Zhao, ‘‘Methods and tools for com-
munity energy planning: A review,’’ Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev., vol. 42,
pp. 1335–1348, Feb. 2015.
[35] G. Mendes, C. Ioakimidis, and P. Ferrão, ‘‘On the planning and anal-
ysis of integrated community energy systems: A review and survey
of available tools,’’ Renew., Sustain. Energy Rev., vol. 15, no. 9,
pp. 4836–4854, Dec. 2011.
[36] V. Robu, G. Chalkiadakis, R. Kota, A. Rogers, and N. R. Jennings,
‘‘Rewarding cooperative virtual power plant formation using scoring
rules,’’ Energy, vol. 117, pp. 19–28, Dec. 2016.
[37] A. Hany Elgamal, G. Kocher-Oberlehner, V. Robu, and M. Andoni,
‘‘Optimization of a multiple-scale renewable energy-based virtual
power plant in the UK,’’ Appl. Energy, vol. 256, Dec. 2019,
Art. no. 113973. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0306261919316605
[38] G. Chalkiadakis, V. Robu, R. Kota, A. Rogers, and N. Jennings, ‘‘Cooper-
atives of distributed energy resources for efficient virtual power plants,’’ in
Proc. 10th Int. Conf. Auto. Agents Multiagent Syst. (AAMAS), May 2011,
pp. 787–794.
[39] R. Kota, G. Chalkiadakis, V. Robu, A. Rogers, and N. R. Jennings, ‘‘Coop-
eratives for demand side management,’’ in Proc. 7th Conf. Prestigious
Appl. Intell. Syst. (PAIS @ ECAI), Aug. 2012, pp. 969–974. [Online].
Available: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/339761/
[40] I. Antonopoulos, V. Robu, B. Couraud, and D. Flynn, ‘‘Data-
driven modelling of energy demand response behaviour based
on a large-scale residential trial,’’ Energy AI, vol. 4, Jun. 2021,
Art. no. 100071. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S2666546821000252
[41] I. Antonopoulos, V. Robu, B. Couraud, D. Kirli, S. Norbu,
A. Kiprakis, D. Flynn, S. Elizondo-Gonzalez, and S. Wattam,
‘‘Artificial intelligence and machine learning approaches to energy
demand-side response: A systematic review,’’ Renew. Sustain. Energy
Rev., vol. 130, Sep. 2020, Art. no. 109899. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S136403212030191X
[42] H. Ma, V. Robu, N. Li, and D. C. Parkes, ‘‘Incentivizing reliability in
demand-side response,’’ in Proc. IJCAI 25th Int. Joint Conf. Artif. Intell.,
Apr. 2016, pp. 352–358.
[43] H.Ma, D. C. Parkes, andV. Robu, ‘‘Generalizing demand response through
reward bidding,’’ inProc. 16th Conf. Auton. AgentsMultiAgent Syst. (Inter-
national Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems),
2017, pp. 60–68.
[44] R. Meir, H. Ma, and V. Robu, ‘‘Contract design for energy demand
response,’’ in Proc. 26th Int. Joint Conf. Artif. Intell., Aug. 2017,
pp. 1202–1208, doi: 10.24963/ijcai.2017/167.
[45] V. Robu, M. Vinyals, A. Rogers, and N. R. Jennings, ‘‘Efficient buyer
groups with Prediction-of-Use electricity tariffs,’’ IEEE Trans. Smart Grid,
vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 4468–4479, Sep. 2018.
[46] M.Andoni, V. Robu,W.-G. Früh, andD. Flynn, ‘‘Game-theoreticmodeling
of curtailment rules and network investments with distributed generation,’’
Appl. Energy, vol. 201, pp. 174–187, Sep. 2017.
[47] M. Andoni, V. Robu, B. Couraud, W.-G. Früh, S. Norbu, and
D. Flynn, ‘‘Analysis of strategic renewable energy, grid and storage capac-
ity investments via Stackelberg-cournot modelling,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 9,
pp. 37752–37771, 2021.
[48] B. Couraud, S. Norbu, M. Andoni, V. Robu, H. Gharavi, and D. Flynn,
‘‘Optimal residential battery scheduling with asset lifespan considera-
tion,’’ in Proc. IEEE PES Innov. Smart Grid Technol. Eur. (ISGT-Europe),
Oct. 2020, pp. 630–634.
[49] M. Andoni,W. Tang, V. Robu, and D. Flynn, ‘‘Data analysis of battery stor-
age systems,’’ CIRED-Open Access Proc. J., vol. 2017, no. 1, pp. 96–99,
Oct. 2017.
[50] D. Roman, S. Saxena, V. Robu, M. Pecht, and D. Flynn, ‘‘Machine learn-
ing pipeline for battery state-of-health estimation,’’ Nature Mach. Intell.,
vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 447–456, May 2021.
[51] V. Robu, E. H. Gerding, S. Stein, D. C. Parkes, A. Rogers, and
N. R. Jennings, ‘‘An online mechanism for multi-unit demand and its
application to plug-in hybrid electric vehicle charging,’’ J. Artif. Intell.
Res., vol. 48, pp. 175–230, Oct. 2013.
[52] C. Etukudor, B. Couraud, V. Robu, W.-G. Früh, D. Flynn, and C. Okereke,
‘‘Automated negotiation for Peer-to-Peer electricity trading in local energy
markets,’’ Energies, vol. 13, no. 4, p. 920, Feb. 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/13/4/920
[53] M. Andoni, V. Robu, and D. Flynn, ‘‘Blockchains: Crypto-control your
own energy supply,’’ Nature, vol. 548, no. 7666, p. 158, Aug. 2017.
[54] M. Andoni, V. Robu, D. Flynn, S. Abram, D. Geach, D. Jenkins,
P. McCallum, and A. Peacock, ‘‘Blockchain technology in the energy
sector: A systematic review of challenges and opportunities,’’ Renew.
Sustain Energy Rev., vol. 100, pp. 143–174, Feb. 2019.
[55] K. Pumphrey, S. L. Walker, M. Andoni, and V. Robu, ‘‘Green hope or red
herring? Examining consumer perceptions of peer-to-peer energy trading
in the United Kingdom,’’ Energy Res. Social Sci., vol. 68, Oct. 2020,
Art. no. 101603.
[56] B. P. Koirala, E. van Oost, and H. van der Windt, ‘‘Community energy
storage: A responsible innovation towards a sustainable energy system?’’
Appl. Energy, vol. 231, pp. 570–585, Dec. 2018.
[57] J. Sardi and N. Mithulananthan, ‘‘Community energy storage, a critical
element in smart grid: A review of technology, prospect, challenges and
opportunity,’’ in Proc. 4th Int. Conf. Eng. Technol. Technopreneuship
(ICE2T), Aug. 2014, pp. 125–130.
[58] D. Strickland, M. A. Varnosfederani, J. Scott, P. Quintela, A. Duran,
R. Bravery, A. Corliss, K. Ashworth, and S. Blois-Brooke, ‘‘A review of
community electrical energy systems,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Renew.
Energy Res. Appl. (ICRERA), Nov. 2016, pp. 49–54.
112040 VOLUME 9, 2021
S. Norbu et al.: Modeling Economic Sharing of Joint Assets in Community Energy Projects
[59] D. Parra, S. A. Norman, G. S. Walker, and M. Gillott, ‘‘Optimum commu-
nity energy storage for renewable energy and demand load management,’’
Appl. Energy, vol. 200, pp. 358–369, Aug. 2017.
[60] M. Elkazaz, M. Sumner, E. Naghiyev, Z. Hua, and D. W. P. Thomas,
‘‘Techno-economic sizing of a community battery to provide commu-
nity energy billing and additional ancillary services,’’ Sustain. Energy,
Grids Netw., vol. 26, Jun. 2021, Art. no. 100439. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352467721000102
[61] D. Parra, S. A. Norman, G. S. Walker, and M. Gillott, ‘‘Optimum commu-
nity energy storage for renewable energy and demand load management,’’
Appl. Energy, vol. 200, pp. 358–369, Aug. 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261917305524
[62] D. Parra, M. Gillott, S. A. Norman, and G. S. Walker, ‘‘Opti-
mum community energy storage system for PV energy time-shift,’’
Appl. Energy, vol. 137, pp. 576–587, Jan. 2015. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030626191400871X
[63] M. A. Hossain, R. K. Chakrabortty, M. J. Ryan, and H. R. Pota,
‘‘Energy management of community energy storage in grid-
connected microgrid under uncertain real-time prices,’’ Sustain.
Cities Soc., vol. 66, Mar. 2021, Art. no. 102658. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221067072030874X
[64] J. Sardi, N. Mithulananthan, M. M. Islam, and C. K. Gan, ‘‘Frame-
work of virtual microgrids formation using community energy stor-
age in residential networks with rooftop photovoltaic units,’’ J. Energy
Storage, vol. 35, Mar. 2021, Art. no. 102250. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352152X21000190
[65] D. Gebbran, S. Mhanna, Y. Ma, A. C. Chapman, and G. Verbič,
‘‘Fair coordination of distributed energy resources with volt-var
control and PV curtailment,’’ Appl. Energy, vol. 286, Mar. 2021,
Art. no. 116546. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0306261921000933
[66] J. Guerrero, B. Sok, A. C. Chapman, and G. Verbič, ‘‘Electrical-
distance driven peer-to-peer energy trading in a low-voltage network,’’
Appl. Energy, vol. 287, Apr. 2021, Art. no. 116598. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261921001380
[67] B. Wang, G. Verbic, and W. Xiao, ‘‘Power sharing in an islanded LV
distribution network fully installed with PV-battery systems based on grid-
forming control,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Smart Grids Energy Syst. (SGES),
Nov. 2020, pp. 459–464.
[68] M. I. Azim, W. Tushar, and T. K. Saha, ‘‘Investigating the impact of
P2P trading on power losses in grid-connected networks with prosumers,’’
Appl. Energy, vol. 263, Apr. 2020, Art. no. 114687. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261920301999
[69] M. Mokhtar, V. Robu, D. Flynn, C. Higgins, J. Whyte, C. Loughran, and
F. Fulton, ‘‘Automating the verification of the low voltage network cables
and topologies,’’ IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 1657–1666,
Mar. 2020.
[70] B. Couraud, P. Kumar, V. Robu, D. Jenkins, S. Norbu, D. Flynn, and
A. R. Abhyankar, ‘‘Assessment of decentralized reactive power control
strategies for low voltage PV inverters,’’ in Proc. 8th Int. Conf. Power Syst.
(ICPS), Dec. 2019, pp. 1–6.
[71] G. Tévar-Bartolomé, A. Gómez-Expósito, A. Arcos-Vargas, and
M. Rodríguez-Montañés, ‘‘Network impact of increasing distributed PV
hosting: A utility-scale case study,’’ Sol. Energy, vol. 217, pp. 173–186,
Mar. 2021. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0038092X2100092X
[72] M. Grzanić, J. M. Morales, S. Pineda, and T. Capuder, ‘‘Electricity cost-
sharing in energy communities under dynamic pricing and uncertainty,’’
IEEE Access, vol. 9, pp. 30225–30241, 2021.
[73] C. B. Heendeniya, ‘‘Agent-based modeling of a rule-based community
energy sharing concept,’’ in Proc. E3SWeb Conf., vol. 239, 2021, pp. 1–10.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202123900001
[74] M. Moncecchi, S. Meneghello, andM.Merlo, ‘‘A game theoretic approach
for energy sharing in the Italian renewable energy communities,’’ Appl.
Sci., vol. 10, no. 22, p. 8166, 2020.
[75] L. Li, ‘‘Optimal coordination strategies for load service entity and commu-
nity energy systems based on centralized and decentralized approaches,’’
Energies, vol. 13, no. 12, p. 3202, 2020.
[76] P. Chakraborty, E. Baeyens, K. Poolla, P. P. Khargonekar, and P. Varaiya,
‘‘Sharing storage in a smart grid: A coalitional game approach,’’ IEEE
Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 4379–4390, Jul. 2019.
[77] M. Marzband, R. R. Ardeshiri, M. Moafi, and H. Uppal, ‘‘Distributed gen-
eration for economic benefit maximization through coalition formation–
based game theory concept,’’ Int. Trans. Elect. Energy Syst., vol. 27, no. 6,
p. e2313, Jun. 2017.
[78] I. Abada, A. Ehrenmann, and X. Lambin, ‘‘On the viability of energy




[79] A. Chis and V. Koivunen, ‘‘Coalitional game-based cost optimization of
energy portfolio in smart grid communities,’’ IEEE Trans. Smart Grid,
vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 1960–1970, Mar. 2019.
[80] C. Feng, F. Wen, S. You, Z. Li, F. Shahnia, and M. Shahidehpour, ‘‘Coali-
tional game-based transactive energy management in local energy commu-
nities,’’ IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 1729–1740, May 2020.
[81] X. Liu, S. Wang, and J. Sun, ‘‘Energy management for community energy
network with CHP based on cooperative game,’’ Energies, vol. 11, no. 5,
p. 1066, 2018.
[82] Y. Yang, G. Hu, and C. J. Spanos, ‘‘Optimal sharing and fair cost allo-
cation of community energy storage,’’ 2020, arXiv:2010.15455. [Online].
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/2010.15455
[83] UKERC Energy Data Centre. Thames Valley Vision End Point
Monitor Data. Accessed: May 11, 2020. [Online]. Available:
http://www.thamesvalleyvision.co.uk/
[84] IEEE 13-Bus Feeder. Resources | PES Test Feeder. Accessed: Jan. 3, 2020.
[Online]. Available: https://site.ieee.org/pes-testfeeders/resources/
[85] Met Office. (2019). MIDAS Open:UK Hourly Solar Radiation Data,
V201901. Centre for Environmental Data Analysis, 01 March 2019.
Accessed: Feb. 15, 2021. [Online]. Available: http://data.ceda.ac.uk/badc/
ukmo-midas-open/data/uk-radiation-obs/dataset-version-201901/orkney
[86] K.Movassagh, A. Raihan, B. Balasingam, and K. Pattipati, ‘‘A critical look
at Coulomb counting approach for state of charge estimation in batteries,’’
Energies, vol. 14, no. 14, p. 4074, 2021.
[87] ABB. UPS and Power Conditioning | ABB. Accessed: Jul. 12, 2021.
[Online]. Available: https://new.abb.com/ups
[88] The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets(Ofgem). About the FIT Scheme-
Closure of the FIT Scheme. Accessed: May 23, 2020. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-programmes/fit/about-fit-
scheme
[89] Money Supermarket. Fixed-Price Electricity Tariffs Comparison.
Accessed: Feb. 11, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.
moneysupermarket.com/gas-and-electricity/compare-electricity-prices/
[90] The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem). Compare Gas
and Electricity Tariffs: Ofgem-Accredited Price Comparison Sites.
Accessed: Apr. 15, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/
information-consumers/energy-advice-households/switching-energy-
tariff-or-supplier
[91] Octopus Energy. Agile Octopus Tariff. Accessed: Feb. 11, 2020. [Online].
Available: https://octopus.energy/agile/
[92] C. Long, J. Wu, C. Zhang, L. Thomas, M. Cheng, and N. Jenkins, ‘‘Peer-
to-peer energy trading in a community microgrid,’’ in Proc. IEEE Power
Energy Soc. Gen. Meeting, Jul. 2017, pp. 1–5.
[93] C. Curry, ‘‘Lithium-ion battery costs and market squeezed margins
seek technology improvements & new business models,’’ Bloomberg,
London, U.K., BNEF Rep., Jul. 2017. [Online]. Available: https://data.
bloomberglp.com/bnef/sites/14/2017/07/BNEF-Lithium-ion-battery-
costs-and-market.pdf
[94] BloombergNEF. Battery Pack Prices Fall as Market Ramps up With
Market Average at $156/kWh In 2019. Accessed: Dec. 16, 2020.
[Online]. Available: https://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-pack-prices-fall-
as-market-ramps-up-with-market-average-at-156-kwh-in-2019/
[95] PV Europe. Price of Li-Ion Batteries for Vehicles Below 200 USD/kWh
in 2019. Accessed: Dec. 9, 2020. https://www.pveurope.eu/energy-
storage/price-li-ion-batteries-vehicles-below-200-usd-kwh-2019
[96] R. Hensley, J. Newman, and M. Rogers, ‘‘Battery technology charges
ahead,’’ in Sustainability & Resource Productivity. New York, NY, USA:
McKinsey & Company, Jul. 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.
mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability-and-resource-
productivity/our-insights/battery-technology-charges-ahead
[97] EIA. (2020). Cost and Performance Characteristics of New Generat-
ing Technologies, Annual Energy Outlook 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/assumptions/pdf/table_8.2.pdf
[98] G. Zhao, E. R. Nielsen, E. Troncoso, K. Hyde, J. S. Romeo, and
M. Diderich, ‘‘Life cycle cost analysis: A case study of hydro-
gen energy application on the Orkney Islands,’’ Int. J. Hydrogen
Energy, vol. 44, no. 19, pp. 9517–9528, Apr. 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360319918325035
[99] B. Widera, ‘‘Renewable hydrogen implementations for combined
energy storage, transportation and stationary applications,’’ Thermal Sci.
Eng. Prog., vol. 16, May 2020, Art. no. 100460. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2451904919302628
VOLUME 9, 2021 112041
S. Norbu et al.: Modeling Economic Sharing of Joint Assets in Community Energy Projects
SONAM NORBU (Member, IEEE) received the
Bachelor of Engineering degree in electrical engi-
neering from the College of Science and Technol-
ogy (CST), Royal University of Bhutan (RUB),
in 2007, and the Master of Engineering degree in
power electronics and drives from the Hindustan
Institute of Technology and Science, Hindustan
University, India, in 2010. He is currently pur-
suing the Ph.D. degree with the Smart Systems
Group, School of Engineering and Physical Sci-
ences, Institute of Sensors, Signals and Systems, Heriot-Watt University,
Edinburgh, U.K.
His Ph.D. research is focused on exploring the issues of enabling resilient
energy communities or local microgrids using the tools from distributed AI
(specifically multi-agent systems) and cooperative game theory. He lectures
at CST, RUB.
BENOIT COURAUD (Member, IEEE) received
the engineering degree from the Ecole Centrale
de Lyon, Ecully, France, in 2009, and the M.Sc.
degree in electronic and electrical engineering
from Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China,
in 2009.
His Ph.D. research focused on radio frequency
identification power transfer optimization at ISEN,
Toulon, France, and the IM2NP Laboratory, Uni-
versity of Aix Marseille, Marseille, France. He is
currently a Research Associate with Heriot Watt University, working on
artificial intelligence, local electricity market solutions and optimization
tools for renewable energy integration, and smart grids operations.
VALENTIN ROBU is a Senior Research Sci-
entist at CWI, National Research Institute for
Mathematics and Computer Science, Amsterdam,
and a part-time Associate Professor at TU Delft,
The Netherlands. Before October 2020, he was
an Associate Professor at Heriot-Watt University,
Edinburgh, Scotland, U.K., where he still holds a
visiting appointment. He is also a Research Affil-
iate at the Center for Collective Intelligence, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), USA.
Prior to this, he was a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Southamp-
ton, U.K., and a Visiting Scholar with the Computer Science Department,
Harvard University, USA. He has published over 150 papers in top-ranked
journals, conferences, and edited volumes, in both the areas of artificial
intelligence and electrical engineering. He is a Co-Investigator in several
large-scale energy and AI-related projects, such as U.K. National Centre for
Energy Systems Integration (CESI), U.K. Offshore Robotics for Certification
of Assets Hub (ORCA Hub), Community-Scale Energy Demand Reduction
in India (CEDRI), and Responsive Energy Flexibility Demonstration Project
in Orkney Islands (Reflex). He is also a Principal Investigator and an Aca-
demic Lead of the Knowledge Transfer Partnership (KTP) Project NCEWS
(Network Constraints Early Warning Systems) with SP Energy Networks.
MERLINDA ANDONI (Member, IEEE) received
the Diploma degree in electrical and computer
engineering from the National Technical Univer-
sity of Athens (NTUA), Greece, in 2010, and
the M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in renewable energy
and distributed generation from Heriot-Watt Uni-
versity, Edinburgh, U.K., in 2015 and 2019,
respectively.
Since 2017, she has been working as a
Research Associate with the Smart Systems
Group, Heriot-Watt University, supportingU.K.’s National Centre for Energy
Systems Integration (CESI) Project. Her research interests include inves-
tigating the potential of multi-agent systems, game theory and blockchain
technologies for decentralized energy networks, and microgrids.
Dr. Andoni is a member of the Technical Chamber of Greece. Her awards
and honors include the Academic Award in the Young Professionals Green
Energy Awards 2018 and the Best Student Paper Award in a workshop in the
AAMAS 2016 Conference.
DAVID FLYNN (Member, IEEE) received the
B.Eng. degree (Hons.) in electrical and elec-
tronic engineering, the M.Sc. degree (Hons.) in
microsystems, and the Ph.D. degree in microscale
magnetic components from Heriot-Watt Univer-
sity, Edinburgh, in 2002, 2003, and 2007, respec-
tively. He is currently a Professor of smart systems
at Heriot-Watt University. He is the Founder of
the Smart Systems Group (SSG), Heriot-Watt Uni-
versity. He is the Associate Director of U.K.’s
National Centre for Energy Systems Integration. The research of the SSG
involves multidisciplinary expertise across energy systems, sensors, data
analysis, and cyber physical systems. He teaches smart system integration,
electrical engineering, and energy systems. He is an Institute of Engineering
and Technology (IET) Scholar as a recipient of IET Leslie H Paddle Prize.
He is the Vice Chair of IET Scotland. He is an Associate Editor of IEEE
ACCESS.
112042 VOLUME 9, 2021
